Article details

Title: Adult sexual experiences with children
Author(s): Chin-Keung Li
Affiliation: Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, England
Citation: Li, C.K., “Adult sexual experiences with children,” in Li, C.K., West, D.J., & Woodhouse, T.P., Children’s sexual encounters with adults, London: Duckworth, 1990a, pp. 139-316.

Notes

• Prevalence
• Effects of adult-child sexual interaction
• Models for understanding adult-child sexual interaction
• The issue of consent
• Legal implications

A 1981 review by Constantine examined about 30 studies and concluded that there is no single inevitable result of child-adult sexual contact. It may or may not lead to harm. Which of these possibilities occurs depends on several factors: the child’s freedom to consent, the child’s knowledge of sex and social norms, and the family’s and society’s reactions to the activity. Constantine commented that this applies to sexual relationships in general, not just to those between children and adults.

Another 1981 review of 12 studies conducted by Powell and Chalkley concluded that some children participate actively, that there are no long-term ill effects (including no induction into homosexuality), and that, although on the surface there seems to be a correlation between what is considered child sexual abuse and psychopatholgy, this connection is not causal—children found to be disturbed were so before the sexual activity occurred. But they pointed out that “catastrophic reactions may be shown by particular children under particular circumstances. Further research should concentrate upon pinpointing these children and circumstances.”

Other researchers disagree. One researcher criticized the above study on the grounds that most of the studies it examined were outdated. One 1981 summary of 50 studies conducted by Mrazek and Mrazek found that many more of the studies showed harm than not.

A 1981 review of long-term effects by Steele and Alexander concluded that children were badly affected long after the incidents. They wrote that even though other factors besides sexual abuse contribute to harm, the sexual abuse seems to be the “central core” around which other harmful experiences are organized. In addition, even when no obvious harm is observable, much pain and turmoil may exist beneath a seemingly normal appearance.

The Steele and Alexander study shows that there are two fundamental problems in attempting to determine the effects of child-adult sexual interaction.

• Speculating that there is hidden pain and turmoil points out the difficulty in defining “harm.” Must one assume the existence of harm that the child is unaware of? To postulate hidden ill-effects is to pre-empt the answer to the question of harm.
• It is very difficult to establish a causal link between sexual abuse and harm. Steele and Alexander do admit the possibility of little long-term harm if there are no other detrimental factors beyond the sexual interaction. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that these detrimental factors may be independent of the sexual activity, and that they constitute the “central core” rather than the sexual activity. Thus, it may be misleading to single out adult-child sexual activity as the only or major cause of later maladjustment.

A 1986 review conducted by Browne and Finkelhor examined 26 studies. It acknowledged that many of the studies were methodologically inadequate, but Brown and Finkelhor wrote that they believed the studies showed some CSA victims suffer from fear, anxiety, depression, anger, hostility, inappropriate sexual behavior, stigma, low self-esteem, self-destructive behavior, substance abuse, sexual difficulties, mistrust, and revictimization.

There was more harm when the abuser was the father, when there was genital contact, when there was coercion, and when family members were unsupportive. They organized the effects into four categories, which they called “traumagenic dynamics.” However, these categories confuse rather than clarify the issue because Browne and Finkelhor later write as if they are powerful, concrete, objective entities which cause harmful effects, rather than being categories of effects as they had originally defined them.

It may be impossible to design a study that could find a causal link between childhood sexual experience with adults and subsequent effects—especially those that are long-term. Complex interactions among many factors are what produce later effects in life. Thus the research finds contradictory results. Attempts to solve this problem using sophisticated statistical analyses may cause the personal qualities of human experiences to be lost.

As a result, researchers who try to find causal links end up relying on post hoc or ad hoc explanations which read more into the statistics than they allow, and which depend on the researchers’ own tacit understanding of human life. Thus they speculate about the emotional experience of the victims. If researchers are going to study this experience, a narrative approach would be better.

The focus of researchers depends on value judgments and their definition of abuse. Those who view all types of adult-child sexual activity as abusive assume such activity always causes harm, and orient their search accordingly. For example, the Browne and Finkelhor review ignored earlier studies which found children participated willingly and no harm occurred when coercion was not present. Similarly, a 1985 review by Chesterman examined only certain studies to conclude that child-adult sexual interaction is always harmful.

On the other hand, those who are sympathetic to certain types of sexual contact in certain situations (e.g., consensual, without outside intervention, in the absence of abusive environments) may focus on such contact, and find no harm. Constantine’s review made such a conclusion, and used the results to promote the sexual liberation of children.

The inclusion of all types of sexual experiences in the same study confuses the issue. Finding certain results from one type of experience then claiming they apply to all types biases the conclusions. Thus, the general question, “Is child sexual contact with adults harmful?” may not even be a meaningful one.

Definitions of harm raise further problems. Both increased sexual activity (“promiscuity”) and decreased sexual activity (“sexual dissatisfaction”) are sometimes defined as harmful effects. Classifying them as such is based on value judgments.

An example of how the researcher’s view affects his or her interpretation of the data is seen in Fromuth’s 1986 survey of students. Her statistical calculations showed that sexual abuse accounted for less than 2% of the variation in students’ psychological adjustment, and that there was no difference in “sexual self-esteem” between abused and non-abused students. Far more correlations between abuse and effects were statistically insignificant than significant, and she admitted that sexual abuse might not in itself be related to later adjustment.

However, she still concluded that the “no harm” hypothesis could not be accepted. Her reasons were that her definition of abuse may have been too broad, that the healthy people in her study may have masked the effects of the unhealthy ones, and that the time between the abuse and the study may have been too short to find long-term effects. The author of this article writes that the two latter explanations were attempts to explain away her findings using ad hoc arguments.

The author examines two opposing arguments regarding adult-sexual contact. He first summarizes the current public consensus which objects to child-adult sexual interaction on moral grounds. This consensus is best illustrated by Finkelhor who argues:

1. Children and adolescents do not possess necessary knowledge about sexual relationships so they cannot make informed decisions about them.
2. Children and adolescents are not truly free in relation to adults since they are taught to always obey adults.
3. For these reasons, children and adolescents cannot give informed and free consent, which is the foundation for all sexual relationships.
4. Thus, child-adult sexual interaction is always unethical and wrong.

This conclusion is intended to be independent of any scientific questions.

The author finds the following gaps in Finkelhor’s argument. First, his argument in fact is not independent of scientific considerations. Steps 1 and 2 can be verified scientifically.

Children may be able to acquire the necessary knowledge. Their knowledge about sex accumulates as they grow; they do not suddenly receive it when they reach the age of consent. Furthermore, Finkelhor does not explain how much knowledge one must have before one should be permitted to have sex. Many adults have little knowledge, but their freedom is not therefore restricted.

In addition, children and adolescents need not lack freedom in relation to adults. It is possible to study the extent to which they are able to circumvent what adults try to do to them.

Secondly, while it is a common argument that consent should form the basis of a sexual relationship, even in adult relationships it is rarely discussed, especially the adequacy of each person’s sexual knowledge. The ideal of informed consent often does not exist.

Thirdly, Finkelhor favors special protection for children and adolescents because they are powerless, and he therefore advocates for a benevolent paternalism. However, power is not necessarily associated with commission of unethical acts. In fact, wrongfulness is independent of the possession of power; a powerless person can commit wrong against one with power.

The argument that children need special protection from sex with adults is only valid if the sex is assumed to be wrong or found to be damaging. The first assumption begs the question, since Finkelhor’s argument is intended to prove that it is wrong. The second possibility requires scientific study which Finkelhor claims is not part of his argument. Thus, wrongfulness is still not proven, but rather assumed as a starting point.

Fourthly, Finkelhor argues that because sex is so emotion-laden, contact with adults leads to long-term stigmatization. Similarly, Abel and colleagues argue that if the child were aware of the sexual standards of society and its consequences for his decision, he would not consent. This position assumes that current standards and social reactions should not be challenged.

It could be argued that this stigmatization results from society’s mystification of sex and irrational reaction to pedophilia, which make sexual contact unnecessarily emotion-laden. Finkelhor does not consider the possibility of teaching children about sex and giving them the freedom to choose.

The author concludes that Finkelhor’s argument is essentially circular:

He next addresses arguments that favor depathologizing and decriminalizing consensual adult-child sexual interaction. Such arguments typically rest on two bodies of evidence:

• Sexological studies of children and adolescents show they have sexual feelings and are often sexually active. Thus, sexuality is a dynamic force in childhood and adolescent development.
• Anthropological studies show that adult-child sexual contact is not unusual in some cultures, thus it cannot be taken as inherently pathological. Furthermore, one 1977 study documented counter-cultural communes in the U.S. where sexuality was openly discussed, and in which consensual child-child and child-adult sexual activity was socially accepted.

A typical proponent of this view is Tom O’Carroll, who argues as follows: Children are sexual, and need and seek affection. Affection and sex should not be dissociated, but rather they complement each other. In many non-Western cultures and in history, adult-child sexual contact was not problematic. Present western culture is irrationally sexually repressive, and this repression causes psychological maladjustment. Rather than doing harm, adult-child sexual activity helps avoid this maladjustment. Society’s traumatizing reactions do cause harm. Children could and would consent if left to their own devices. Willingness is sufficient; full knowledge is a red herring.

This line of argument suffers from its own problems. First, sexological studies do not make as strong a case as some would like to believe. They usually describe peer sexual activity, rather than addressing the issue of adult-child activity. Few deny that children are sexual, but they are not necessarily so in the same sense that adults are. The healthy sexual development of children found in communes has been attributed to the general atmosphere of freedom, rather than simply to early sexual activity.

In addition, the relevance of cross-cultural studies to modern western culture may be limited for several reasons. In other cultures, pedophilia as an exclusive or permanent orientation is rare, even in those such as ancient Greece. Child-adult sexual contact is usually part of a cultural or religious ritual, so that the meaning of the activity is very different from that in western society.

Some research suggests that the contact in some cultures, including that of ancient Greece, may have been exploitive and quite abusive. At any rate, it has not been shown convincingly that the sexual values or practices of other cultures are preferable or advantageous to those of western society.

O’Carroll’s version of the argument is also problematic. First, in a given situation, it is not always clear what the child is seeking. It is not necessarily sex—at least not in the way the adult understands it. The claim that sex should not be dissociated from affection is simplistic; most affectionate relationships do not involve sex. In addition, it is not clear that the prohibition of child-adult sex is a form of repression, or that modern western culture has more psychological problems due to sexual repression.

Furthermore, O’Carroll’s position that knowledge and awareness are irrelevant for consent is problematic: In general, willingness is not a sufficient criterion for endorsing an action if it is potentially harmful. Also, it is difficult to determine a child’s willingness when there is a possibility of deception or bribery. And speaking of “leaving children to their own device” is misleading; other adults are usually around to exert influence, including the pedophile. The argument does not justify the pedophile’s initiative in seeking children.

While O’Carroll’s argument is not successful, the author writes that it points out the urgent need to make two distinctions: between adults who use force and those who do not in their sexual contacts with children; and between children who endure sex acts done to them and those who actively participate in sexual relationships with adults.

Whether or not adult-child contact is harmless, or the harm that arises is due only to society’s reaction, is a complex issue that is far from settled. The effects of such contact are embedded in the social situation, and pedophiles must take this fact into account. Informed consent must include the knowledge of the social consequences of adult-child sex.

The author proposes the following ethical position:

• Adult-child sex involving force or coercion is unacceptable.
• Pressure or deception is unacceptable, but more work is needed to clarify what constitutes them.
• Seduction is not easy to ascertain since it is difficult to distinguish between self-serving seduction and sensual interaction within a consensual relationship.
• The meaning of consent must be clarified. Apparent willingness is not sufficient, but neither is categorically defining all children as unable to consent. A flexible and situation-specific approach is needed.
• Since some adult-child sexual relationships may be neither coercive nor damaging, rejecting all as abusive and morally wrong is less fruitful than studying a continuum of adult-child interactions. More research (like that of Sandfort) on children’s perspectives in these relationships is needed.